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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

PAPERS REGARDING

- I. ORAKZAIS: Request of certain Clans to be taken under British Administration.
- II. ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS: Operations.
- III. MOHMANDS: Operations.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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1908.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
PART I.—ORAKZAIS : REQUEST OF CERTAIN CLANS TO BE TAKEN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.						
1	Letter (Extract), with 5 enclosures.	1904. August 18	Government of India.	Secretary of State for India.	Proposal to extend protection to certain of the Orakzai clans on the Kohat border.	1
2	Despatch (Extract).	October 28	Secretary of State for India.	Government of India.	States that H. M. Government are unwilling to authorise, under present circumstances, proposal in No. 1.	11
PART II.—ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS : OPERATIONS.						
1	Letter (Extract), with 5 enclosures.	1898. November 17	Government of India.	Secretary of State for India.	Agreement with the Khyber Pass Afridis.	13
2	Letter (Extract), with 10 enclosures.	1905. January 5	Ditto	Ditto	Relations with the Afridis. Raid on Darshi Khel village. Question of allowances.	15
3	Telegram	March 3	Viceroy	Ditto	} Raid on Matanni police post ...	21
4	Ditto	March 7	Ditto	Ditto		...
5	Ditto	March 13	Ditto	Ditto	Raid at Garhi Shahdad ...	22
6	Ditto	March 15	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of raider at Kaddam ...	22
7	Letter (Extract), with 33 enclosures.	May 25	Government of India.	Ditto	Offences of Afridis and others in British territory. Punishment of offenders. Details of raids reported in Nos. 3 to 6. Question of allowances.	22
8	Telegram	1907. January 16	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Proposed action against Zakka Khel. No action to be taken other than baramta and stoppage of allowances without reference to Secretary of State.	38
9	Ditto	January 21	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Proposed action against Zakka Khel. Question postponed till March, 1907. Raid near Peshawar.	38
10	Ditto	January 29	Ditto	Ditto	Raid on serai at Matanni ...	38
11	Letter (Extract), with 22 enclosures.	March 7	Government of India.	Ditto	Proposed occupation of the Bazar Valley. Review of conduct of the Zakka Khel Afridis. Badhber, Pabbi and Matanni raids.	39
12	Telegram	March 24	Viceroy	Ditto	Proposed occupation of the Bazar Valley. Recommendation of Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province.	59
13	Ditto	March 31	Ditto	Ditto	Raid on Khaizara village ...	60
14	Ditto	April 9	Ditto	Ditto	Badhber raid. Release of kidnapped Hindu.	60
15	Ditto	April 10	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Proposed operations against Zakka Khel. Expediency of immediate measures questioned. Enquiry as to strength of force required in the event of operations.	60
16	Ditto	April 22	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Proposed operations against the Zakka Khel: Question postponed till September, 1907. Force to be employed, &c.	60
17	Ditto	May 1	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Proposed operations against the Zakka Khel: Postponement approved.	60

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
18	Letter (Extract), with 15 enclosures.	1907. May 30	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Conduct of the Zakka Khel Afridis. Further raids reported.	61
19	Telegram	October 31	Viceroy	Ditto	Raid on Pabbi	66
20	Ditto	November 25	Ditto	Ditto	Necessity of punitive measures against Zakka Khel Afridis. Recent raids committed by the section.	66
21	Ditto	November 30	Ditto	Ditto	Raids on Matanni and near Marai in Kohat. Opposition shown to Railway Survey party at Smatzai.	67
22	Ditto	December 3	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Matanni and Marai raids: Enquires if raiders were Zakkas.	68
23	Ditto	December 4	Ditto	Ditto	Request to be kept fully informed as to course of events.	68
24	Ditto	December 5	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Matanni and Marai raids. States that the gangs were mainly composed of Zakkas.	68
25	Ditto	December 11	Ditto	Ditto	Raids on Masho Khel and on Khyber road near Fort Maude.	68
26	Papers transmitted by Government of India, 5 and 12 December, 1907; received 21 and 28 December, 1907.	—	—	—	Opposition to Loi Shiiman Railway Survey Party: firing on Smatzai and Shinpokh.	69
27	Telegram	1908. January 4	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Raid on transport post at Jalozai ..	71
28	Ditto	January 8	Ditto	Ditto		
29	Letter (Extract), with 50 enclosures.	January 9	Government of India.	Ditto	Offences of Zakka Khel. Proposal that Afridi jirga should be summoned and invited to insist on Zakka Khel giving reparation for the past, and behaving properly in future; failing successful intervention on the part of jirga, an advance to be made into the Bazar Valley. Correspondence with regard to events reported in Nos. 19 to 28.	71
30	Telegram	January 27	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Raid on Kacha Garhi railway station.	93
31	Ditto	January 30	Ditto	Ditto		
32	Ditto	January 30	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Permanent occupation of Bazar Valley disallowed. Limitation of measures to blockade, and punitive measures in the Bazar Valley. Request that terms of proposed communication to Afridi jirga may be reported for sanction.	94
33	Ditto	January 30	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Raid on Peshawar City	95
34	Ditto	January 31	Ditto	Ditto	Operations against Zakka Khel: Requests sanction for immediate action. Communication to the Afridis.	95
35	Ditto	February 1	Ditto	Ditto		
36	Ditto	February 2	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Expedition into Bazar Valley: Proposal approved subject to restrictions contained in No. 32. Suggestion as to most effective method of punitive action.	96
37	Ditto	February 4	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Bazar Valley Expedition. Force to be employed and scope of operations.	96
38	Ditto	February 6	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Communication to be made to Amir of Afghanistan. Approval of force proposed in No. 37. No occupation or annexation contemplated; object of measures strictly punitive.	97
39	Ditto	February 7	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Raid on Abazai village	97
40	Ditto	February 8	Ditto	Ditto	Raid on Tirahi Bala; Hindu's house looted.	97

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
41	Telegram.	1908. February 9	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Communication to the Amir. Instructions for expedition issued by Government of India.	98
42	Ditto	February 10	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Request for details of force to be employed and of operations.	98
43	Ditto	February 12	Ditto	Ditto	Request for estimate of cost of operations.	98
44	Ditto	February 12	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Composition of force to be employed.	98
45	Ditto	February 13	Ditto	Ditto	Estimate of cost of operations ...	99
46	Ditto	February 13	Ditto	Ditto	Zakka Khel have moved families, flocks, &c., to Ningrahar and Bars, &c.	99
47	Ditto	February 14	Ditto	Ditto	Announcement to Afridi jirga; their proposal to put pressure on Zakka Khel.	100
48	Ditto	February 14	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Instructions to General Willcocks. Asks that substance may be telegraphed. Inquiry as to supply of expanding bullets.	100
49	Ditto	February 15	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Reports substance of instructions to the Officer Commanding the Bazar Valley Field Force. No expanding bullets have been issued.	100
50	Ditto	February 16	Ditto	Ditto	Bazar Valley Field Force: arrival at Walsi, near China.	101
51	Ditto	February 16	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto	Junction of columns ...	101
52	Ditto	February 17	Ditto	Ditto		
53	Ditto	February 19	Viceroy	Ditto	Report on situation from Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Field Force.	102
54	Ditto	February 19	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto	Destruction of fortified towers of China.	102
55	Ditto	February 19	Ditto	Ditto		
56	Ditto	February 20	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Proclamation by the Amir of Afghanistan forbidding his subjects to help Zakka Khel. Enemy's casualties.	103
57	Ditto	February 20	Ditto	Ditto	Attitude of Afridi jirgas. Instruction to General Willcocks.	103
58	Ditto	February 20	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto	Reconnaissance of Sassobi Pass ...	104
59	Ditto	February 21	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Instructions reported in No. 57 approved. Avoidance of any operations liable to be construed as infringement of Afghan territory.	104
60	Ditto	February 21	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Secretary of State	Action at Halwai	104
61	Ditto	February 22	Viceroy	Ditto	Possibility of settlement through Afridi jirga: Instructions to General Willcocks.	105
62	Ditto	February 23	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations with Afridis: arrival of jirga.	105
63	Ditto	February 23	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto		

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
64	Telegram	1908. February 24	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Secretary of State	Report on situation. Enemy's reinforcements.	105
65	Ditto	February 24	Ditto	Ditto	Reconnaissances in neighbourhood of Jabgai. Attack on hill above Halwai. Retention of troops so long as their presence conducive to satisfactory result of negotiations.	106
66	Ditto	February 26	Secretary of State	Viceroy		
67	Ditto	February 25	Viceroy	Secretary of State		
68	Ditto	February 25	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto	Negotiations with Afridi jirga: Possibility of settlement. Reinforcement of Zakka Khel by Sangu Khel Shinwaris.	107
69	Ditto	February 26	Ditto	Ditto	Meeting of Afridi jirga and Zakka Khel at Halwai.	108
70	Ditto	February 26	Ditto	Ditto		
71	Ditto	February 27	Viceroy	Ditto	Raid on Peshawar City railway station.	109
72	Ditto	February 27	Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition.	Ditto	Negotiations between Afridi jirga and the Zakka Khel. Attitude of lashkar of Sangu Khels and others from Afghan territory.	109
73	Ditto	February 27	Ditto	Ditto		
74	Ditto	February 28	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival in camp of Afridi jirga ...	110
75	Ditto	February 28	Ditto	Ditto	Report on military and political situation.	110
76	Ditto	February 29	Ditto	Ditto	Settlement with Afridi jirga. Bazar Valley vacated by troops.	110
77	Ditto	March 1	Ditto	Ditto	Settlement with Afridi jirga ...	111
78	Letter with 2 Enclosures.	April 2	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Report on the political aspect of the Bazar Valley operations and orders thereon.	111
79	Letter (Extract), with 2 Enclosures.	April 9	Ditto	Ditto	Bazar Valley Field Force: Report on military operations and orders thereon. Summary of casualties.	116
80	Despatch	May 22	Secretary of State	Government of India.	Appreciation of services of political officers.	121
81	Ditto	May 29	Ditto	Ditto	Bazar Valley Field Force; appreciation of services of General Sir J. Willcocks, officers and troops.	122
82	Letter with 2 Enclosures.	June 4	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Final settlement with the Afridis. Political Report.	122

PART III.—MOHMANDS : OPERATIONS.

1	Letter (Extract) with an enclosure.	1897. January 13	Government of India.	Secretary of State	Assumption of Political control over certain Mohmand clans.	125
2	Telegram	1908. April 3	Viceroy	Ditto	Raid on Marozai, Mirzadhar and Chikkor villages.	126
3	Ditto	April 17	Ditto	Ditto	Gathering of Mohmands under Hazrat Sahib and Sufi Sahib Movement towards British territory.	126
4	Ditto	April 21	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Mohmand lashkar at Kamali. Patrols and posts fired on. Movement of troops.	127

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
5	Telegram	1908. April 21	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Proposed offensive operations against Mohmand gathering. Movement of troops. Strength of Mohmand lashkars.	127
6	Ditto	April 21	Ditto	Ditto	Troops fired on by Mohmands: military preparations.	128
7	Ditto	April 21	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation by General Willcocks from camp Matta, Moghal Khel.	128
8	Ditto	April 22	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation by General Anderson. Occupation of Sadr Garhi.	128
9	Ditto	April 22	Ditto	Ditto	Spread of fanatical feeling to Shamoza, Utman Khel, and Bajaur.	129
10	Ditto	April 22	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Sanctions such military action as may be considered necessary.	129
11	Ditto	April 23	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Departure of mullas and sheikhs, &c., to join Mohmands.	129
12	Ditto	April 23	Ditto	Ditto	Military situation: reported arrival of Hazrat Sahib and men at mouth of Gundab.	129
13	Ditto	April 23	Ditto	Ditto	Movement of troops to Shabkadr, &c.	130
14	Ditto	April 23	Ditto	Ditto	Enemy attacks Abazai, Shabkadr Matta and Garisad.	130
15	Ditto	April 23	Ditto	Ditto		
16	Ditto	April 23	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Suggestion as to immediate dispersal of Mohmand gathering.	130
17	Ditto	April 24	Viceroy	Secretary of State	General Willcocks authorised to cross border and assume offensive, when necessary.	131
18	Ditto	April 24	Ditto	Ditto	Movement of troops to Mohmand border. Details.	131
19	Ditto	April 24	Ditto	Ditto	Peshawar-Shabkadr telegraph line cut.	131
20	Ditto	April 24	Ditto	Ditto	Mohmand Field Force: composition.	131
21	Ditto	April 24	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on enemy's position to west of Matta and Shabkadr.	132
22	Ditto	April 25	Ditto	Ditto		
23	Ditto	April 25	Ditto	Ditto		
24	Ditto	April 26	Ditto	Ditto	Reconnaissance up Gundab Valley: enemy's position abandoned.	132
25	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Military situation: report ...	132
26	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Dispersal of lashkar moving against Panjkora bridge. Failure of attempt to cause rising in Dir and Swat.	133
27	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Additions to Mohmand lashkars. Failure of attempt to cause rising of Afridis.	133
28	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Mohmand casualties. People of Ningrahar disheartened. Attitude of Afridis.	133
29	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Movements of Mohmand leaders. Constitution of enemy's forces in recent engagements.	133
30	Ditto	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Advance of two brigades from Mohmand border authorised.	134
30	Ditto	April 28	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Suggested blockade and stoppage of allowances as possible alternatives to proposed advance.	134
31	Ditto	April 28	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Return of Sarkaunri Mian Mulla to Afghan territory.	134

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
82	Telegram	1908. April 28	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Offer of service by Loargai Shinwaris. Efforts of Afridi elders to counteract influence of Afghan sheikhs in Tirah.	134
33	Ditto	April 29	Ditto	Ditto	Reports blockade suggested in No. 80 impracticable owing to interposition of friendly tribes.	135
34	Ditto	April 29	Ditto	Ditto	Situation in Ningrahar, Dara, Bazar and Tirah. Enemy reported to be dispersing. Position of the Hazrat Sahib.	135
35	Ditto	April 29	Ditto	Ditto	Military situation at Shankargarh	135
36	Ditto	April 30	Ditto	Ditto	Report as to enemy's intention to attack Panjkora or Dargai. Situation in Ningrahar and Tirah. Arrival of Khugiani lashkar at Peshbolak. Attitude of Afridis.	135
37	Ditto	April 30	Ditto	Ditto	Movements of Hazrat Sahib and Sufi Sahib. Reinforcements to Khugiani lashkar.	136
38	Ditto	May 1	Ditto	Ditto	Summons to attend jirga: attitude of the tribes. Firing on Border Military Police at Abazai.	136
39	Ditto	May 1	Ditto	Ditto	Bajaur, Dir. and Swat remain loyal	136
40	Ditto	May 1	Ditto	Ditto	Reported discontent of Sufi Sahib's lashkar at Peshbolak. Situation in Tirah.	137
41	Ditto	May 2	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Landi Kotal anticipated. Government of India's decision not to make advance till situation is clearer. Instructions to General Willcocks as to communication to be made to jirgas.	137
42	Ditto	May 2	Ditto	Ditto	Mohmand Field Force; composition	138
43	Ditto	May 3	Ditto	Ditto	Enemy's advance on Landi Kotal: occupation of Khargali and Bagh and attack on Michni. Failure of Sufi Sahib to collect Afridi lashkar.	138
44	Ditto	May 3	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of General Willcocks at Landi Kotal.	139
45	Ditto	May 4	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of certain Mohmand jirgas and efforts to secure attendance of others.	139
46	Ditto	May 4	Ditto	Ditto	Attitude of Afridis: Zakka Khel refuse to join Sufi Sahib.	139
47	Ditto	May 4	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Michni Kandao block-house: continuous firing on Landi Kotal.	139
48	Ditto	May 4	Officer commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	} Landi Kotal: defeat of Sufi Sahib's lashkar. Disposition of forces in the Khyber.	140
49	Ditto	May 4	Viceroy	Ditto		
50	Ditto	May 5	Ditto	Ditto	Inadequate attendance at Mohmand jirga; intimation to the tribes.	140
51	Ditto	May 5	Ditto	Ditto	Upper Swat: failure of attempts to raise lashkar on behalf of Mohmands. Situation in Dir: message from Viceroy expressing high appreciation of loyalty of Dir chiefs.	141
52	Ditto	May 5	Ditto	Ditto	Landi Kotal: disappearance of lashkar over Afghan boundary. Enemy's casualties.	141
53	Ditto	May 6	Ditto	Ditto	Departure of Pandiali and Halimzai jirgas to communicate Government's intimation to other sections. (See No. 50.) Enemy's movements.	141

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
54	Telegram	1908. May 6	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Afridi: Failure of Sufi Sahib to induce Zakka Khel and other Afridis to join him; his return to Afghanistan.	142
55	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	Death of Major H. Coape-Smith ...	142
56	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	Return of troops from the Khyber to Peshawar.	142
57	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	Government's intimation to tribes: Jirga summoned to discuss question of attendance at Shankargarh, Afghan subjects recalled.	142
58	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	All quiet on border from Abazai to Michni.	143
59	Ditto	May 8	Ditto	Ditto	Return of troops to Peshawar from the Khyber.	143
50	Ditto	May 9	Ditto	Ditto	Situation in Ningrahar. Arrival of Hazrat Sahib at Kama. Reported recall of Mullas.	143
61	Ditto	May 9	Ditto	Ditto	Afghan subjects recalled. Refusal of certain clans to attend jirga at Shankargarh.	143
62	Ditto	May 10	Ditto	Ditto	Necessity for prompt restoration of order: despatch of troops into Mohmand country authorised.	143
63	Ditto	May 10	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Action reported in No. 62 approved	144
64	Ditto	May 10	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Situation in Swat and Ningrahar. Attitude of Upper Mohmands. Movements of Sartor fakir.	144
65	Ditto	May 11	Ditto	Ditto	Dir and Swat. Assurance of loyalty in reply to Viceroy's message (See No. 51).	144
66	Ditto	May 12	Ditto	Ditto	Situation in Ningrahar. Movements of Hazrat and Sufi Sahib. Attitude of Banizais.	144
67	Ditto	May 12	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Mohmand expedition. Advance to begin on 13th May.	145
68	Ditto	May 13	Viceroy	Ditto	Instructions to General Willcocks	145
69	Ditto	May 13	Ditto	Ditto	Composition of Mohmand Field Force.	145
70	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto		
71	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto		
72	Ditto	May 15	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	General Willcocks arrives at Nahaki. Reconnaissance up the Khapak Pass.	146
73	Ditto	May 15	Viceroy	Ditto		
74	Ditto	May 15	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Further reconnaissance of Khapak, &c. Casualties.	147
75	Ditto	May 16	Viceroy	Ditto	All quiet on border from Michni to Abazai.	147
76	Ditto	May 17	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on camp picquets at Darwazagai. Destruction of towers of Kandahari Sufis and Halimsais.	147
77	Ditto	May 17	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto		
78	Ditto	May 18	Viceroy	Ditto	Mohmands reinforced from Afghan territory: Amir's prohibition.	148
79	Ditto	May 18	Ditto	Ditto	All quiet on border from Michni to Abazai.	148
80	Ditto	May 18	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Military operations against Kandahari Sufis.	148

No.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
81	Telegram	1908 May 19	Viceroy	Secretary of State.	Military operations against Kandahari Sufis.	148
82	Ditto	May 19	Ditto	Ditto	Nahaki Camp attacked. Operations near Zarawar China. Destruction of Khan Beg Khor village. Casualties, &c.	148
83	Ditto	May 19	Ditto	Ditto	Mohmand Field Force. Replacement of 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment by 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.	149
84	Ditto	May 20	Officer commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Further attack on Nahaki Camp. Destruction of Kung village towers. Casualties.	149
85	Ditto	May 21	Ditto	Secretary of State	Operations at Umra Killi. Casualties.	149
86	Ditto	May 22	Ditto	Ditto	Operations against Kandahari Sufis. Terms accepted by the Zulbaz and Masand sections of Sufi tribes.	150
87	Ditto	May 23	General Barrett	Ditto	Reconnaissance towards Shabai Pass.	150
88	Ditto	May 24	Ditto	Ditto	Operations at Kargha. Reconnaissance towards Mulla Killai.	150
89	Ditto	May 25	Viceroy	Ditto	Operations against the Sufis: Submission of Sufi and Musa Khel Mitais.	151
90	Ditto	May 25	Officer commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Operations on the Ambahar ...	151
91	Ditto	May 27	Ditto	Ditto	Enemy's casualties on the Ambahar Junction of 1st and 2nd Brigades at Mulla Killai.	151
92	Ditto	May 27	Ditto	Ditto	Submission of Utmanzai, Dawazai and Khwaizai Sections.	151
93	Ditto	May 29	Ditto	Ditto	Operations against the Baizai section at Khuda Khel: Casualties.	152
94	Ditto	May 30	Ditto	Ditto		
95	Ditto	May 30	Ditto	Ditto		
96	Ditto	May 31	Viceroy	Ditto	Death of Lt. W. Young ...	152
97	Ditto	June 2	Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force.	Ditto	Casualties during withdrawal of picquets.	152
98	Ditto	June 2	Viceroy	Ditto		
99	Ditto	June 2	Ditto	Ditto		
100	Ditto	June 4	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Return of troops to Peshawar	153
100	Ditto	June 4	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Mohmand Expedition: Summary of results. Services of General Willcocks and other officers highly commended.	153
100	Ditto	June 4	Secretary of State	Viceroy	Satisfaction of H.M.'s Government at the result: concurs in tribute paid to General Willcocks and other officers.	153
101	Ditto	June 16	Viceroy	Secretary of State	Estimated cost of Zakka Khel and Mohmand operations: details of casualties.	154

PART IV.—APPENDICES.

- I.—List of raids and outrages committed on the North-West Frontier from July, 1899, to July, 1906. (1).—Khyber and Peshawar and Kohat Border. (2).—Kurram. (3).—Dir, Swat, Bajaur and Chitral 155
- II.—List of raids committed by Zakka Khel during the six months from August, 1907, to February, 1908 164

PART I.

ORAKZAIS: REQUEST OF CERTAIN CLANS TO BE TAKEN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 18th August, 1904. Received 5th September, 1904.

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward copy of a letter from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province, submitting a proposal to extend protection to certain of the Orakzai clans on the Kohat border. The clans in question are the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Sipaia, Abdul Aziz Khel, Ibrahimzai, and Chappar Mishtis, whose total fighting strength is estimated at 2,710 men. Of these clans, the Chappar Mishtis only are Sunnis, the others are Shias. The tract which these sections occupy is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles. It extends over both slopes of the Star Ghar range from the Oblan Pass on the east to Dāppa on the west, just short of the point where the road made in 1897 crosses the Sampagga Pass. On the north, the boundary is the Mastura River, with the exception of the portion between Zera and Osi, where land on both banks is owned by the Sipaia; on the south, their territory runs down to the broken and undulating country within the limits of Kachai and Marai, in British territory. The Orakzai clans are divided into two religious sections, of Shias and Sunnis, between whom exists a long-standing animosity, easily fanned by a fanatical leader into bitter conflict. This was the case last summer, when a Muhammadan fanatic, coming, it is believed, from Ghazni, and known as the Malang Fakir, created disturbances in the Orakzai country, and preached a *jihad* against Shias. Several Orakzais joined him, till he had a large following, which had several conflicts with the Shias, in one of which the Fakir was wounded. The Shias in adjacent British territory asked for permission to help their co-religionists, but were not allowed to do so, though probably some of them crossed the border. The organised attack on these Shia clans caused also great excitement amongst their co-religionists in Kurram; and, if matters had proceeded to extremities, it would perhaps have been difficult to have prevented them from joining in the fray in large numbers. The Shias applied for assistance from Government, which was not given them, and declared their intention of asking, in a body, after the termination of the fighting, to be taken over by Government. In August, 1903, owing, it is said, partly to treachery on the part of the Aka Mulla, who, jealous of the ascendancy acquired by the Malang Fakir, gave secret intimation of their plans, the Sunnis were defeated by the Shias. This weakened the influence of the Fakir, though he subsequently managed to raise a general Afridi jirga to carry on the war. The Shias defeated this combined attack, and burned or mutilated the bodies of the Sunnis whom they had killed. This defeat led to the break-up of the jirga, amid mutual recrimination, and to the termination of hostilities. The Orakzais openly denounced the Malang Fakir as an impostor, and he departed from the country, after a futile attempt to raise another jirga. It is rumoured that he returned in June of this year from Afghanistan, and is again trying to raise another gathering to attack the Shias. While the fighting was still in progress last year, the

Chappar Mishtis applied to be taken over by the British Government. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no petition could be entertained until peace had been restored. At the end of the year, after the restoration of peace, the Shia clans commenced to sound the local authorities as to whether, if they petitioned Government to take them over, there was any chance of Government agreeing to do so; they suggested that their tract should be taken over on the lines of Kurram, and expressed their readiness to pay tribute or revenue. It is stated that the so-called religious attacks on the Shias have their real foundation in the desire of the Afridis to annex their neighbours' rich lands; and though the Shias on the last occasion proved that they were able to defend themselves, their wish to be brought under British protection is undoubtedly genuine. The question is constantly mentioned by the tribal jirgas at their meetings with the local political officers, and it is desirable to come to some decision as to the reply to be given to the tribes. Colonel Deane considers that there are many advantages from this extension of control; to take over the country—he says—would definitely stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very substantial guarantee for the peace of the border; while, if we leave things as they are, and if the persecution of these clans by the Afridis and Orakzais, under the cloak of religion, is persistently carried out, there must be a risk of the clans being gradually weakened and ousted, or of their being compelled to throw in their lot with the Afridis, in which case their attitude towards us, which has been hitherto uniformly friendly, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult than it is even at present. Colonel Deane further points out that, if we take over the tract, it will facilitate a greater political control over adjacent Afridi sections, notably the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel, and the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border will be avoided, while there will be the obvious strategical gain of obtaining a position in rear of the Afridi country, whence troops could act, when necessary. He admits that the arrangement would be unpalatable to the Afridis, but he thinks that this may be disregarded. He accordingly recommends that we should give to the clans named the protection which they are anxious to secure, and administer the tract somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, collecting a cess of four rupees per house, and raising for the actual protection of the border a corps of 200 local levies, to be affiliated to the Samana Rifles. The subject has already been considered by the Government of India, in connection with somewhat similar proposals to the present one. In 1894, the Bar Muhammad Khel, one of these Shia sections, submitted a petition to be taken under the control and protection of the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, believed that the offer was a genuine one, but expressed the opinion that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. In 1895, some of the leading men of the Baba Nmasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan also petitioned to be taken over by Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor expressed the same opinion as he had in regard to the Bar Muhammad Khels. The Ali Khel lands form an isolated block in the west of Tirah which in existing circumstances could hardly be taken over. The Government of India accepted His Honour's views in both instances. We enclose a copy of the correspondence which then took place, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's opinion, which was fully concurred in by Mr. Udny, states the case very strongly against the extension of our responsibilities in the tribal tracts beyond the Kohat District. So matters remained until the frontier disturbances of 1897-98, during which these Shia clans maintained an uniformly friendly attitude towards us. At the close of the disturbances the lines on which our frontier policy should be conducted were laid down in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated 28th January, 1898.* The leading principles, inculcated in this despatch, were that no new responsibility should be taken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities, and the protection of the British border; that interference with the tribes must be avoided, where possible; that we must not give any countenance to the idea that Government intended to administer the tribal country, or to enclose it within provincial limits, since the extension of direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities; while annexation would imply a still larger addition to our civil and military establishments, with a very serious and

* See Cd. 496 of 1901, p. 5.

growing burden upon our financial resources. It was further stated that the demarcation of the Durand line had aroused suspicion and misgiving among certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of Government, and that "to gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future actions." It was laid down that "the immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehensions of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence." We do not at this stage propose to discuss the details of Colonel Deane's scheme, since, while the proposal itself involves *pro tanto* a departure from the principles of the frontier policy which were laid down for our guidance in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated the 25th January, 1898, in the discussion which has arisen on the proposal the applicability of those principles in their entirety to existing circumstances has been directly challenged. Should His Majesty's Government be prepared to reconsider the principles therein indicated, we would probably be ready to take action somewhat on the lines now suggested by Colonel Deane, which have undoubtedly much to commend them; but before doing this, we desire, without committing ourselves to any definite expression of opinion, to lay before you the arguments for and against adopting a departure from the policy to which we are at present committed. We are impelled to take this step, partly because we are not unanimous as to the desirability or necessity of extending our responsibilities, and partly because His Excellency Lord Ampthill, who is only in temporary charge of the office of Viceroy, considers that a definite recommendation on an issue which, in view of the light in which it is put forward by some of his advisers, involves a vitally important question of frontier policy, could best be made when permanent arrangements for the Viceroyalty have come into existence. It is urged by opponents of the present proposal that, besides being in contravention of the policy laid down for our guidance, the scheme is calculated to cause excitement among the Afridis; it entails our assuming responsibility for protecting the sections concerned; it will cost not less than a quarter of a lakh of rupees a year, plus a considerable initial expenditure, in return for which we are to receive, by way of tribute, a cess of four rupees per house, or about Rs. 8,000 per annum. Those in favour of the scheme contend that the present proposals differ materially from those before Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1894. Then only one of the sections concerned, and that not the section adjoining British India, had applied for arms or protection; now all the sections, owning a compact block of territory, and running down to within four miles of Kohat itself, have repeatedly asked to be incorporated in British India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, then, could hardly have foreseen the great success which has attended the taking over of the Kurram in 1893, under similar but perhaps more unpromising conditions, as the Turis were hopelessly broken, and this success is cited as an example of what we may expect in the present instance. The cost involved is declared to be small in comparison with the results to be achieved. Further, it is urged that, as these tribes have been consistently friendly to us, and have shown that they possess a considerable power of resistance against aggression, it would be as unchivalrous as impolitic to leave them to be crushed by an overwhelming coalition of their Sunni enemies who have been almost as consistent enemies to us. It is also obvious that if we can hold this tract, and so secure in friendly territory a good road to the heart of Tirah, we shall acquire a most potent lever against the Afridis and Orakzais. In fact, passing from the comparatively petty case in question, our military advisers, while fully recognising that this involves a departure from the policy hitherto laid down for our guidance, consider that the time has arrived when the essential principles of that policy should come under reconsideration. In brief, they are of opinion that our general frontier policy should contemplate the gradual and peaceful extension of our close control over the tribes as far as the Durand boundary, at any rate, where this is necessary on strategical considerations. Lord Kitchener, after a prolonged tour along the whole length of the frontier, during which he penetrated, with a small Militia escort only, into tracts hitherto almost entirely closed to our officers, is convinced that the policy of peaceful penetration is working admirably, and that in the Militia forces that we have raised we have not only reliable bodies for the work that they have to perform, but most valuable instruments of pacification that in the course of time will bring the whole of the tracts, in which they are employed, under our full control. The instance of Baluchistan is adduced to show how the tribes have settled down wherever the direct influence of our officers has been introduced, and even allowing for differences in the Pathan tribes north of the Gomal and those to the south of that

river, it is held that the same results are rapidly following, where, as in Kurram and the Tochi, our officers are dealing with the tribes from within. The tribesmen look to them for guidance in their disputes and difficulties, and our practical interference with the administration of the tracts concerned of necessity increases as time goes on, and is even now much greater than when the country was held by purely military garrisons. It may take longer to bring the Afridis into line, but it is impossible to predict how long it will take until a beginning is made, and if we reject so excellent a chance of making that beginning as is offered to us by the spontaneous and repeated offer of these Shia clans, we can hardly hope that other tribes elsewhere will elect for that closer union with us, which is so essential in the event of military operations, while the Afridis will infallibly attribute our refusal to extend our protection to tribes asking it of their own free will, to our dread of themselves, which will render them even more difficult to deal with in the future. The main objections to this policy are indicated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch already cited. There is the additional objection that the occupation of the tribal territory up to the Durand line brings us into direct contact with a large section of the Afghan frontier, across which raids and counter-raids are of frequent occurrence, for the continuous settlement of which we have not yet found any adequate means. If we eventually bring all the tribes that now lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, we shall become immediately and directly responsible, both for protecting them against attack from, and for restraining them from excursion across, the Afghan border. Then, if the policy of peaceful penetration is actively pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously to our responsibilities. The weaker tribes who have come over to us have undoubtedly benefited largely, and are contented with their position, but it is doubtful if the stronger tribes would view the matter in the same light. The Pathan tribes are greatly attached to what they regard as their independence, that is to say, their freedom to manage their own affairs in their own way, and their exemption from the payment of revenue to any suzerain Power. It seems doubtful whether the stronger tribes would ever voluntarily consent to such relinquishment of their independence as would be involved by inclusion within our administration; and if, by force of temporary circumstances, such a tribe were to agree to absorption in British India, it is probable that, when the special circumstances had passed away, they would regret the action which they had taken, and desire to return to their former status of limited independence. In such an event, serious trouble might arise, if not immediately, at any rate in time of difficulty; and our position, when we were compelled to advance, might become weaker rather than stronger, owing to their discontent. Turning now again to the definite proposal which has given rise to this correspondence, news that the Shias are contemplating making over their country to the British Government has already reached the Afridis, where the question has aroused great interest:—as one emissary graphically expresses himself, "there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not find three or four men discussing the Shia affair." Some argue that, if the Shias wish to give up their country, the Afridis have the first right to it; others are in favour of making an alliance with the Shias, binding themselves never again to attack them or interfere with them, and the general idea is that, if the Shias can be induced to withdraw from the step which they were about to take, the Orakzais and Afridis would make a united protest against the occupation of the tract. It is considered doubtful whether the Afridis and Orakzais generally would proceed to extremities, but the feeling amongst them against annexation is undoubtedly strong. The question of the annexation of the Shia Orakzai tract is also closely connected with the proposal to withdraw the troops from Fort Lockhart, on the Samana, and to replace them by military police, a proposal to which we attach great importance, but to which the military authorities have hitherto been opposed. In view of the great strategical importance of the tract, giving as it does a stronger political and military control over most of the Afridi and Orakzai sections, our military advisers would be prepared, in the event of it being taken over, to concur in the withdrawal of the regular troops which, by removing a visible armed menace to Tirah, might go far to reconcile the tribes to the altered position in the tract in question. This undoubtedly is a strong argument in favour of this small extension of our closer control. Such are the arguments for and against Colonel Deane's present proposals, and for a partial change in the policy laid down in 1898. The force of circumstances has led to a gradual extension of the direct influence of our officers throughout the greater portion of

the tract south of the Safed Koh, and to this extent there has quietly grown up a certain amount of interference with the administration of the border tracts there. None of us is in favour of unduly forcing the pace or of forcible interference with the tribes anywhere, but we are not entirely in accord as to the absolute necessity of availing ourselves of every suitable opportunity, such as that now offered, of extending our friendly control more closely over those tribes whom it is, for strategical reasons, necessary to bind firmly to us in times of peace, so that we may not be leaning on a broken reed when the stress of war is upon us. We therefore think it best to state all the facts and arguments for your consideration at once. Circumstances may render it necessary to arrive at an early decision on the particular case that has given rise to this discussion, and it will doubtless be convenient that it should have been fully reported in advance. Otherwise, we propose to leave our decision on the particular matter over until the autumn, by which time we shall have had further proof of the real wishes of the Shia clans, and shall also be perhaps in a better condition to judge of the probable effects of our acceptance of their offer, if it is again made. On the general question of the desirability of a more active prosecution of our present policy of extension of friendly influence and control over the tribes on the British side of the border up to the Durand line, where this is desirable for strategical reasons, we are content to await the decision at which His Majesty's Government may arrive after full consideration of the weighty arguments that our military advisers have now adduced.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 26th September, 1894.

(Extract.)

I am directed to submit, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated 5th September, 1894, and enclosures, from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, on the subject of the wish of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan to put their country under the control and protection of the British Government, and to convey the following remarks and observations of the Lieutenant-Governor. The Muhammad Khel tract, of which the Bar Muhammad Khel tract is a portion, lies in the south-eastern part of Tirah. It is a Shia patch in a Sunni country and its inhabitants are hard pressed by their neighbours. An idea prevails among the people of those parts that our Government entertains aggressive designs on Tirah, as some of its subordinate officers undoubtedly do, and it is accordingly the most natural thing in the world that the Bar Muhammad Khels should offer us a footing in their country in return for protection against their enemies, especially as they see how we have recently delivered the Turis from their Sunni persecutors. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick accordingly quite agrees with the local officers in thinking that the offer is a genuine and *bonâ fide* one, and with them he should be quite prepared to find that the other sections of the Muhammad Khels would soon join in it. But His Honour thinks at the same time that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. From the point of view of the maintenance of peace with the tribes on our border, there may be something to be said in favour of establishing a position for ourselves there, provided it was an overwhelmingly strong position. Such a position would give us a powerful hold over the Afridis as well as the Orakzais, and would place our arrangements in the Khyber on a more secure footing than they stand at present, but the cost of establishing and maintaining such a position would, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks no one can doubt, be out of all proportion to the advantages to be derived from it. Any movement forward in advance of our present position on the Samana would excite against us the bitterest animosity of the Orakzais and Afridis, and if such a movement was to be made at all, it would have to be made in very great strength. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, therefore, that any idea of establishing for ourselves in Tirah any really strong position in which we would be able to hold our own and dominate the country may be dismissed from consideration. There remains the

suggestion that we should put in what may be called "the thin end of the wedge," that we should start some sort of tribal militia in the tract in question, to be paid and armed by us, which would give us some sort of footing in that tract and would to some extent strengthen the inhabitants of it against their enemies. But the Lieutenant-Governor is just as strongly opposed to this. It would no doubt cost little to start the thing, but it would, in His Honour's opinion, be worse than useless to start anything of the kind; for it would give us no real hold on Tirah and would create such an amount of suspicion and irritation in the minds of the people of that country as would most detrimentally affect our relations with them everywhere and in particular in the Khyber. Moreover, it would be vain to imagine that we could stop, for any time to speak of, at what is proposed. Our protégés would be attacked, and we should have to send a force of regular troops to defend them and would inevitably end by keeping it there, which, as already observed, would be a most serious burthen on us. It is all very well to say at starting that we would not guarantee protection to any one. It would be impossible, with any regard to our own credit, to adhere to that. It cannot be too often repeated, when proposals of this sort are under consideration, that it is absolutely impossible to get a hold over any section of a tribe or any tract of country on the frontier in this way without at the same time giving it a hold over us. These observations would apply to a proposal of the nature now before us in regard to any tribe or section of a tribe in Tirah, but there is an additional reason, and a very weighty one, against adopting any such proposal in the case of these Bar Muhammad Khels, namely, that they as Shias are regarded with fanatical hatred by the great mass of the people of the country round, who are Sunnis, and that to go in there on their invitation and as their protectors would be about the very worst introduction we could possibly have. It must be remembered that we have already established with these Shia communities friendly relations of the same sort that we have established with their Sunni neighbours, that is to say, we employ them on certain frontier services and give them allowances for those services, and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick feels assured that we had better be content with that, at least till we have disposed of the Waziristan question and the other large questions that may arise out of the demarcation. In conclusion, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor has mentioned what has been proposed to Mr. Udny, and that he agrees with His Honour in thinking that it is altogether inexpedient to make any move of the sort suggested.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 5th September, 1894.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward, for the information and orders of Government, copy of a letter of 30th August, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reporting that the jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel have represented that the clan desire to put their country under the control and protection of the Government of India, finding themselves cut off from local supplies of arms and ammunition, owing to the influence of the preaching of Sunni Mullas, and fearing that they will be unable to hold their own against the more numerous and powerful Sunni clans in Tirah. From the Deputy Commissioner's report there seems no doubt that their fear and the wish that is born of it are genuine. Like their brethren of the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel sections of the Muhammad Khel division of the Orakzai tribe, the Bar Muhammad Khel are Shias, and consequently an object of hatred to the surrounding clans; but the physical advantages of their country have enabled them, though outnumbered, to maintain their position. These Shia clans hold the hills between Afridi Waran on the north and the Samilzai ilaqa of Kohat on the south, and are interposed between settlements of the Daulatzai clans and the Mastura Towi Valley. They command one of the shortest routes to the centre of Tirah from the Kohat side, by the Landuki Pass. From their country there is access by the Maturi Pass or the Uchpal Pass to the Bara Valley, and by Waran to the Khyber Afridi settlements in Rajgal and Maidan on the west. Their position overlooks the Hamsaya clans, Mishti, Shekhan and Malla Khel, and lies in rear of the Ismailzai sections, Rabiya Khel, Akhel and Mammuzai. The Deputy Commissioner represents the advantage which control over the Bar Muhammad Khel country would secure to us in the event of operations in Tirah, and, the same view is expressed in the article on Tirah in the North-Western Frontier "Gazetteer." Major Leigh is not explicit as to the manner in which our control would be exercised or protection afforded if Government should desire to take any action upon the offer of this clan. It will be noted that the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel, who are in a similar position, are likely to come forward with the same petition. His view apparently is that we might extend the Border Military Police system so as to raise a tribal Militia holding certain posts in their country, and by this

means protect them from their neighbours. The most detailed expression of the views of Government in regard to extension of control over a trans-border clan that I can quote at present will be found in the instructions which were issued by the Foreign Department of the Government of India in connection with the expedition of 1891 against the Black Mountain tribes. The system approved is there described as one "of tribal management, in which the co-operation and goodwill of the tribal chiefs would be enlisted on the side of peace and order by the grant of tribal allowances in return for service rendered," with the object "by means of allowances and the entertainment of levies to strengthen the authority of the headmen sufficiently to enable them to protect and escort British officers visiting their country, and ensure their attendance when required in the settlement of tribal disputes or tribal outrages." We have here then an opportunity of extending control over the Muhammad Khel Orakzais at a cost perhaps of a few thousand rupees in pay of tribesmen enlisted in a militia as a kind of adjunct to the Border Military Police. The control would no doubt ensure protection of British officers visiting their country, if Government still consider that an object of importance, but in return the tribe ask for some assistance for their own protection. It is, I presume, unlikely that Government would care to guarantee the protection of an independent clan against its neighbours, but it does not seem necessary that we should bind ourselves to do more than to pay and perhaps arm a small tribal militia; ammunition, if not arms, could be given in lieu of money allowances. It is quite possible that when the Sunni clans hear the step which the Bar Muhammad Khel have taken, they may think it worth while not to bully their Shia neighbours to the point of desperation; and this offer may have been actuated by some such hope. I do not suggest that Government should accept anything which would involve responsibility for the protection of the Shia clans, but if with the aid of a purely tribal militia paid by us, but not as servants of Government, and of some assistance in the shape of supply of ammunition, they can hold their own, and in return for that are willing to open their country to us, the offer which they have made should be worthy of consideration; and as they are actuated by the strongest of all motives, self-interest, there is some assurance that the offer is genuine and may be trusted. More detailed proposals would be premature until it is known whether Government consider the advantage worth the expenditure of some few thousand rupees per annum.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Major H. P. P. Leigh, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated 30th August, 1894.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward a report from Mr. D. Donald, Assistant Political Officer, by which it will be seen that the Bar Muhammad Khel clan are anxious to be afforded British protection for the reason that, owing to the edict issued by the Mullas of Tirah, their supply of arms and ammunition has been cut off, and they will be unable in the future to protect themselves from the attacks of their Sunni enemies. I interviewed the Bar Muhammad Khel jirga on the 18th instant at Mastan, and they confirmed what they had already stated to Mr. Donald, and said that they were willing and anxious that their country should be taken over by us. I said that I would report their wishes for the orders of higher authority, but that it was out of the question that we could at present supply them with arms and ammunition. If it be agreed that we should not lose the opportunity now offered it would not be necessary to occupy the country with troops. The Bar Muhammad Khel, in common with the Mani Khel, receive a fairly large allowance for service, and we could easily extend our Border Military Police system to their country, when, with an unlimited supply of ammunition, the positions would be practically impregnable. That this is so is proved by the fact that the Shia Saiyids have up to the present time always held their own when attacked by largely superior numbers of Sunnis. If the Afridis were ever arrayed against us the possession of the Bar Muhammad Khel hills would be most important for us. If you agree that this is a matter for serious consideration (and I personally am of opinion that the benefits which will accrue will be great), I can have a rough survey of the country made showing the boundaries of Shia territory. The Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel (the remaining sections of the Muhammad Khel clan) too would probably soon ask for our protection in the same way as their brethren have done; and it would be easy at any time for myself or Mr. Donald to visit the country and come to a definite conclusion as to what localities would be the best for towers for the defence of the Shia border, manned by their own people enlisted as Border Militia. It might be necessary eventually to give allowances to the Abdul Aziz Khel, which they do not now get, but with this exception a magnificent piece of country would become accessible to us at practically no cost whatever. The Shia clans have always been friendly to us: they gave us material assistance during the Miranzai expeditions, and I think it would be a calamity if they were now driven from their hills by the Sunni tribes, who would thus greatly strengthen their own position, while the Shias would have no course open to them but to flee to British territory, where they would be a source of trouble, and we should not know what to do with them.

Annexure 3.

Report by the Assistant Political Officer, Kohat.

On the 16th August a representative jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan of Orakzais came to see me and requested that I should obtain through you the sanction of Government to help them with arms and ammunition, which would enable them to hold out against the attacks of the Sunnis. The jirga represented that they could not now obtain arms and ammunition from the Afridis, as the Mullas had issued edicts threatening to deprive all Sunnis who sold arms, &c., to Shias of funeral and other religious rites. I informed the jirga that the Government would not grant a request of this kind. The jirga then requested that their tribe may be allowed to come under British rule as they could not defend themselves much longer against the Sunnis as their chief source of supply of arms, &c., had now been cut off by the edict of the Mullas. The jirga also stated that the second request was made with the approval of the whole clan. I brought the jirga up before you on the Samana on the 18th August where the Maliks repeated their request of their clansmen being allowed to become British subjects.

I am of opinion that it is in the interests of Government that this clan should in some way be protected, as the Bar Muhammad Khels have always behaved well and seem well disposed towards Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 27th October, 1894.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 26th September, 1894, regarding the Bar Muhammad Khel clan on the Kohat Border.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India think that no action should be taken to meet the desire of this clan that their country should be put under the control and protection of the British Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 19th August, 1895.

I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 30th July, 1895, and of its enclosures, received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, giving cover to a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, praying to be taken under British protection and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that, as in the case of the similar request of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan, no action be taken on the petition.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 30th July, 1895.

I have the honour to forward copy of an endorsement, dated 27th July, 1895, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, with translation of a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, imploring to be taken under British protection.

After the orders of Government upon the similar request put forward last year by the Bar Muhammad Khel, it seems unnecessary for me to say anything about this petition.

Annexure 2.

Endorsement by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, dated 27th July, 1895.

The following translation of a petition presented to me by the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel tribe on the 17th July is forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for information.

On a previous occasion I recommended that the petition of the Shia inhabitants of the Bar Muhammad Khel country should be favourably listened to by Government, and that they should be recognized as British subjects. The suggestion, however, was not considered feasible. This petition is of a similar nature, and I have told the petitioners that though, as they wished it, their request would be forwarded, yet there was not the least chance of its being acceded to. In the former case the tract of country offered to us was an undivided stretch of hills with no inhabitants save Shias. In the present case, although some of the villages concerned are large and powerful, yet they are mixed up with Sunni communities, and their annexation would be impracticable, even if desirable.

Annexure 3.

Translation of the petition from Shias of Ali Khel, dated 16th July, 1895.

(Extract.)

Although we Baba Numasi, of Talai, Ali Khel and Mirwas Khel, number 1,000 armed men and possess rich tracts of Ali Khel, Chango Channa and other hilly tracts of Ali Khel, yet we are so hardly oppressed by the Sunnis and their mullas that we are much more inclined than before to submit ourselves to the yoke of the British Government and to obey its commands cordially. We have been making this request for some years past, and now hope that our request to be taken over by the British Government may be accepted. The 1,000 men of our tribe promise on oath that they will furnish supplies required by the British Government and will fight against the enemies of Government if ordered to do so. At present we are quite independent and shall be most grateful if taken over by Government. If we are taken over by Government, there would be no inconvenience to Government, nor would there be any opposition. We assure Government that we will pay revenue and render any services required of us, even if the Government do not take the trouble of occupying our country. We, therefore, first of all declare on oath that these 1,000 men are ready to sacrifice their lives for the British Government, and again beg to request that our old standing petition may once more be laid before Government, and that we may be made British subjects, which is the only course open to us to enable us to escape the tyranny of the Sunnis, and for this act of benevolence we shall ever pray for the prosperity of Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 6th September, 1895.

I am directed to reply to your letter, dated the 19th August, 1895, regarding a petition presented to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat by certain Shias belonging to the Ali Khel clan of the Orakzai tribe, in which they pray to be taken under British protection.

2. The Government of India agree with His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that no action need be taken on the petition.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 14th May, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the letter dated the 6th September, 1895, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, on the subject of extending protection to certain clans on the Kohat Border. The question has again arisen, and as circumstances have entirely changed since the time of the letter under reference, I deem it advisable again to lay the question before the Government of India. A reference to the diaries and reports of the summer of

1903 will show the detailed history of the religious war which was waged on the Kohat border. The Orakzai clans are divided into the two religious sections of Shias and Sunnis. The latter, assisted by the Afridis under the leadership of the Fakir, attacked the Shia clans in force. The nominal object was the conversion of the Shias, but the real inducement was the desire of the Afridis to annex their rich lands for themselves. The Shia clans showed themselves able to defend their own borders and the fighting ended in the discomfiture of the Sunnis. While the fighting was still pending, a Sunni clan, the Chappar Mishtis, applied to be taken over. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no such petition could be entertained until peace had been assured. In addition to this clan, the Shia clans of the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Abdul Aziz Khel, Sipaia and Ibrahimzai are now also making overtures to be taken over. They express their desire to come under Government control somewhat on the same lines as the Kurram clans, but are unwilling to make a formal petition, as on the former occasion, until assured that such a petition will not be rejected. The fighting strength of these tribes is approximately—

Mani Khel	600
Bar Muhammad Khel	1,500
Sipaia	350
Abdul Aziz Khel	80
Ibrahimzai	80
Chappar Mishtis	100
Total	<u>2,710</u>

but these numbers will increase considerably if the security of the tract is assured by occupation. The entire tract is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles, containing about 70 villages of the various clans. The soil itself is generally of an excellent nature. There are large irrigated tracts, especially down the valley of the Mastura, while the lands dependent on rainfall have always within experience rendered abundant harvests. Fruit cultivation is extensively practised. There can be no doubt that, with a continuity of peace, all the conditions of the country point to a growth of wealth. There are many advantages to be derived from this extension of control. To take over the country would be definitely to stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very considerable guarantee to the peace of the border, as our numerous Shia subjects within the adjacent border must become involved in the feud should it show any signs of substantial recrudescence. The same remark applies to a certain extent to our Sunni subjects. If this persecution of these clans under the cloak of religion by the Afridis and Orakzais is persistently carried out, there must be a risk and danger of the present clans being gradually weakened and ousted or of being driven to throw in their lot with the Afridis; in which case their attitude, which has hitherto been uniformly friendly to Government, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult even than it is at present. The occupation of this tract would aid materially in the protection of the settled area within the Kohat border. The position is one which would render practicable a certain amount of political control over the adjacent Afridi clans, notably the Zakka Khels and Aka Khels, while the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border would be averted. There is, moreover, the obvious strategical gain in obtaining a position near the Afridi country, from which troops could act when necessary. As regards the objection that this advance will have an unsettling effect on the Afridis and other clans, I am not inclined to regard this seriously. The Pathan custom whereby a weaker seeks the protection of a stronger is so clearly defined and so frequently acted upon among the clans themselves that its extension to Government protection affords no reasonable ground for discontent. In return for this protection, if afforded, I would propose a cess of four rupees per house, which ought to yield about Rs. 8,000 annually. The tract might be administered somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. For the actual protection of the border, a locally raised Corps of approximately 200 levies, affiliated to the Samana Rifles and occupying 4 posts, should be sufficient to guard against outside aggression. The

initial cost of this establishment would be roughly Rs. 24,000 and the annual cost Rs. 36,000. It is, however, to be noted that, in the event of these proposals being sanctioned, it would probably be possible later to do away with the Border Military Police posts at Marai, Kachai, Alizai and Danozai Tang, at an annual saving of approximately Rs. 4,000. As these clans constantly bring up the question at the meetings of their Jirgas with the local officers, I consider it my duty to refer it for orders. The policy of the Government of India, is, I understand, a forward one only when necessity compels, and stationary where circumstances permit. In the present proposals, political advisability and strategic advantage are clear. Actual necessity at the present time cannot be urged. But it is a question whether it is not better to act now, at the desire of the tribes concerned, rather than to run the risk of the difficulties which would be involved by the extension of Afridi influence and power over these clans. The present position may be compared with that in the Kurram, where aggression, with the real object of obtaining possession of their lands, carried on under the guise of religious war, compelled the Turis to seek Government protection rather than throw themselves on the mercies of their persecutors. After careful consideration, I have come to the opinion that to accede to the desire of these tribes and bring them under Government protection would be advantageous both to themselves and to Government.

No. 2.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated 28th October, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have considered your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, dated the 18th August, 1904, as to the proposal submitted by the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province to take under our political control certain clans of the Orakzais on the Kohat border, who have applied for the protection of the British Government. The reasons in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal are clearly stated in his letter of the 14th May, 1904, and it is further claimed for the step which he contemplates that, if successfully accomplished, it would render practicable the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Lockhart and their replacement by military police. Colonel Deane expresses the opinion that the proposed extension of our control will not have any seriously-unsettling effect on the Afridis and other tribes adjoining the district in question. On the other hand, your Excellency states that the action of the clans in applying for our protection has already caused considerable excitement in Tirah, and you recognise that the feeling on the subject among the Afridis and Orakzais generally is undoubtedly strong, though you consider it doubtful whether they would proceed to extremities, if effect is given to the proposed policy. I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the question must be considered not as an isolated one, but in connection with the general lines of policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch of the 28th January, 1898, to govern our relations with the tribes along the frontier. It appears from your letter that those members of your Excellency's Government who are most strongly in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal advocate it on the ground that, for strategical reasons, the principle of avoiding, where possible, interference with the tribes must be abandoned, and that we must contemplate the necessity of extending our control as far as the Durand boundary on this section of the frontier, so as to obviate the danger which would arise, in time of war, if the tract of country between the Kurram and the Khyber should be left in the occupation of practically independent tribes, over whom we have exercised no direct influence. Lord Salisbury's Government, however, when they arrived at the conclusions formulated in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch, were fully alive to the force of the arguments in favour of a policy of gradual and continuous extension of the field of our political control, and to the anomalies arising from the absence of such control. But they were convinced, by the experience of the tribal risings of 1897, that the policy they laid down was the sound one; and the history of the last five years does not appear to His Majesty's Government to afford grounds for modifying it in any material

sense. His Majesty's Government also attach great weight to the view, expressed in your letter, that, even if we eventually bring the tribes which lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, the result will be to add seriously to our responsibilities. His Majesty's Government are therefore unwilling, after full consideration of both sides of the case as presented in your letter, to authorise, in present circumstances, any material departure from the general policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch; and they see no sufficient reason, on the information now before them, for incurring the risks attaching to the proposed extension of the tribal area under our control.
